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ADDRESSING UTAH’S SCHOOL TO PRISON PIPELINE 
 
Tyler B. Bugden* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
On May 19, 2011, thirteen-year-old middle school student F.M. was removed 
from his physical education class for generating fake burps that “made the other 
students laugh and hampered class proceedings.”1 Ms. Mines-Hornbeck, the 
middle school physical education teacher, requested assistance from the School 
Resource Officer (“SRO”), Officer Arthur Acosta, who arrested F.M. “for 
interfering with the educational process.”2 For this offense, Officer Acosta 
searched, handcuffed, and drove F.M. in a patrol car to the juvenile detention 
center where F.M. was booked and detained.3 The school suspended F.M. “for the 
remainder of the 2010–11 school year.”4  
This scenario is symptomatic of a nationwide trend, commonly referred to as 
the School to Prison Pipeline (“STPP”), in which “alarming numbers of young 
people are suspended, expelled, or even arrested for relatively minor 
transgressions.”5 Former Attorney General Eric Holder explained that the STPP 
produces “high out-of-school suspension rates” causing “lower-than-average 
graduation rates,” making students “feel unwelcome in their own 
schools. . . . [D]isrupt[ing] the learning process,” and having “lasting negative 
effects on the long-term well-being of our young people—increasing their 
likelihood of future contact with juvenile and criminal justice systems.”6 
Alarmingly, Holder indicated that the STPP targets “students of color and those 
                                                      
*© 2017 Tyler Bugden. Executive Social Justice Editor, Utah Law Review, J.D. 
Candidate May 2018, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. Tyler served as the 
Program Director of Salt Lake Peer Court from 2013–2015, and the President of the Utah 
Youth Court Association from 2014–2016. The author would like to thank Professor Jojo 
Liu for her thoughtful feedback and the staff of the Utah Law Review for their outstanding 
work editing this piece.  
1 A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1129–30 (10th Cir. 2016).  
2 Id.; see also N.M. STAT ANN. § 30-20-13(D) (2011) (prohibiting interference “with 
the educational process of any public or private school”).    
3 Holmes, 830 F.3d at 1130.  
4 Id.  
5 Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at Frederick Douglass High 
School (Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-
delivers-remarks-department-justice-and-department-education [https://perma.cc/S7BN-
NEZP]. 
6 Id. For a groundbreaking and thorough discussion on how America’s criminal 
justice system has perpetuated a racial caste system, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW 
JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 2–19 (2012).  
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with disabilities,” giving them “different and more severe punishments than their 
peers.”7  
In 2016, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) published its report, School-
to-Prison Pipeline: Preliminary Report, documenting the nationwide presence of 
the STPP and its disproportionate effects on students of color, students with 
disabilities, and LGBTQ-identifying students.8 Among many other contributors to 
the STPP, the report highlighted the negative role that SROs have played in 
criminalizing student behavior and funneling students from the classroom to the 
courtroom.9 The ABA’s Preliminary Report also points to implicit bias as a 
contributing factor, and highlights how the “limited constitutional rights” of 
students in school is a “law-related cause” of the STPP.10   
Utah is not immune from these problems.11 In 2014, the Public Policy Clinic 
at S.J. Quinney College of Law released its study, From Fingerpaint to 
Fingerprints: The School to Prison Pipeline in Utah, exposing the STPP in Utah’s 
public schools.12 The report warns that many of Utah’s school districts have 
“overly subjective and harsh disciplinary policies that permit suspension . . . for 
vague offenses,” and Utah’s children of color are disproportionately disciplined 
and referred to law enforcement for these offenses.13  
                                                      
7 Holder, supra note 5.   
8 SARAH E. REDFIELD & JASON P. NANCE, AM. BAR ASS’N, SCHOOL-TO-PRISON 
PIPELINE: PRELIMINARY REPORT 10–11 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/administrative/diversity_pipeline/stp_preliminary_report_final.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7MX8-23KU].   
9 Id. at 50–54.   
10 Id. at 50, 54–56 (“Other law-related causes discussed in somewhat less detail 
include the impact of zero tolerance policies, the limited constitutional rights of students in 
school, low academic achievement, and high stakes testing.”); see also Jason P. Nance, 
Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 919, 936–40 
(2016) (explaining how students’ limited constitutional protections at school contribute to 
the school to prison pipeline).  
11 See JORDIN ALBERS ET AL., UNIV. OF UTAH, FROM FINGERPAINT TO FINGERPRINTS: 
THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE IN UTAH 5–15 (2014), https://www.nawj.org/uploads/pdf 
/conferences/CLE/Fingerpaint%20to%20Fingerprint%20School%20to%20Prison_Pipeline
%20in%20Utah.pdf [https://perma.cc/MG4L-2GEZ] (revealing how the STPP operates in 
Utah by analyzing suspension data); UTAH JUVENILE JUSTICE WORKING GRP., FINAL 
REPORT 1 (2016), http://uacnet.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Utah-Juvenile-Justice-
Working-Group-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GS8-W7AH] [hereinafter FINAL 
REPORT] (demonstrating how Utah’s Juvenile Justice System suffers from bias, abuse of 
discretion, and disparate outcomes); VANESSA WALSH, UNIV. OF UTAH, DISPARITIES IN 
DISCIPLINE: A LOOK AT SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS FOR UTAH’S AMERICAN INDIAN 
STUDENTS 3–5 (2015) (showing that American Indian students, “the smallest student 
demographic in the state . . . was the most frequently expelled, referred to law enforcement, 
and arrested for school related incidents.”). 
12 ALBERS ET AL., supra note 11, at 3. 
13 Id. at 3; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1–2, 6–7, 9–10.  
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In 2016, the Utah Juvenile Justice Working Group (“Working Group”) 
published its findings from a yearlong “data-driven assessment of the Utah 
juvenile justice system,” highlighting many harms of Utah’s STPP.14 The Working 
Group’s Final Report revealed widespread problems with Utah’s juvenile justice 
system, ranging from “[d]isparities based upon race and geography” to a lack of 
“[a]ffordable, accessible” evidence-based diversion programs to help rehabilitate 
youth offenders.15   
To address the causes and the harmful effects of the STPP, analysts suggest: 
expanding the legal protections for juveniles;16 refraining from using SROs for 
disciplinary issues;17 clearly distinguishing educator and administrator disciplinary 
responsibilities from SRO responsibilities;18 retraining SROs to better understand 
the effects of the STPP on youth and how to work with diverse youth 
populations;19 adopting restorative justice practices and other evidence-based 
alternatives to the juvenile justice system;20 and reforming the discretionary power 
of state actors to cite, refer, and sentence youth within the juvenile justice system.21 
                                                      
14 FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1.  
15 Id. at 1–2.  
16 See id. at 15; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 12; Developments in the Law–
Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1763–69 (2015) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment 
protections afforded students should be modified); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: 
An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1236 (1970) (arguing that there will be 
no revolution in juvenile justice until juveniles are granted the right to counsel); cf. In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967) (“Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that 
unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for 
principle and procedure.”). 
17 See ALBERS ET AL., supra note 11, at 4, 20; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 
12–13; JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, EDUCATION UNDER ARREST: THE CASE AGAINST 
POLICE IN SCHOOLS 31 (2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/ 
documents/educationunderarrest_fullreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/37UQ-P589]. 
18 See REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 13; MOISES PROSPERO, DMC EVIDENCE-
BASED, BEST PRACTICES INTERVENTION REPORT 6 (2014), https://www.nttac.org/views/ 
docs/dmccasp/Utah_DMC_Best_Practices_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HBL6-7248].  
19 See ALBERS ET AL., supra note 11, at 20–21; FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 9; 
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 17, at 32; PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 6–7; 
REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 12–13.    
20 See ALBERS ET AL., supra note 11, at 6, 22; FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 12–13; 
PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 6; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 13. For a discussion 
on restorative justice, see infra Part B.2.(a). 
21 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 12–21; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 
13. See generally Sacha M. Coupet, What To Do With the Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The 
Role of Rhetoric and Reality About Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the 
Juvenile Justice System, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 1341–46 (2000) (arguing for guiding 
discretion towards the use of individualized, restorative justice based justice for youth 
offenders); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of 
Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 436–
61 (2013) (arguing that reforming prosecutorial decision-making in the juvenile justice 
system could reduce the racial disparities in the juvenile justice system).  
1064 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
In response to the alarming evidence of Utah’s STPP, Utah passed a number 
of laws implementing some of these recommendations.22 In 2016, Utah passed the 
“School Resource Officers” Bill (“SRO Law”) that requires school districts and 
police departments to formally define the role of SROs in schools, and requires 
SROs to receive training specific to their job as school resource officers.23 In 2017, 
Utah passed S.B. 134, “Indigent Defense Commission Amendments,” suggesting 
that counsel must be provided “at all stages” for “[i]ndigent parties in juvenile 
delinquency and child welfare proceedings,”24 and H.B. 239, “Juvenile Justice 
Amendments,” guiding the exercise of discretion throughout the juvenile justice 
system with the use of standards and procedures, the limitation of punitive options, 
and the expansion of evidence-based rehabilitative services.25 
This Note will evaluate how these reforms address Utah’s STPP. Part A 
discusses how students’ limited constitutional rights, school discipline policies, 
and untrained SROs with undefined roles contribute to the STPP in Utah. Part B 
outlines how these reforms address the causes and effects of Utah’s STPP, and 
argues that while they are productive, they fail to address the bias and abuse of 
discretion that contribute to, as well as the disparate outcomes manifested in, 
Utah’s STPP. This Note argues that Utah’s existing network of restorative justice 
youth courts should be used to curtail the causes and effects of Utah’s STPP. Part 
C proposes additional measures that Utah should take to address the STPP.  
 
A.  Student Rights, Policing Schools, and the School to Prison Pipeline 
 
In an attempt to ensure our public schools are safe, school districts have 
implemented zero tolerance policies, courts have weakened students’ constitutional 
rights, teachers have been given broad authority to discipline students, and SROs 
have been injected into our public schools without training or clearly defined 
responsibilities. The practical effect of these measures is the STPP—the over 
criminalization of problematic student behavior.  
 
1.  Student Rights Are Limited in Public Schools 
 
Although the Supreme Court has maintained that students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,”26 Supreme Court jurisprudence 
and case law from around the nation suggest that students in schools have limited 
                                                      
22 See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11-1603, 1604 (2016); H.B. 239, 62d Leg., Gen. 
Sess. (Utah 2017); S.B. 134, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017).  
23 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11-1603, 1604 (2016).  
24 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-804 (2016); S.B. 134, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 
2017). 
25 H.B. 239, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017). 
26 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) 
(holding that prohibiting students from wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam 
war violated their First Amendment rights). 
2017] UTAH’S SCHOOL TO PRISON PIPELINE 1065 
constitutional rights.27 Focused on efficiency in administrative decision-making 
aimed at preserving “a safe environment conducive to education in the public 
schools,” courts have weakened students’ privacy and due process rights while 
expanding the discretionary power of school officials.28 The tension in America’s 
juvenile justice system between the constitutional rights of juveniles and the parens 
patriae29 power of the state to train juveniles is manifest in the STPP.30  
 
(a)  Zero Tolerance Policies 
 
After the horrific shootings at Columbine High School in 1999, “moral panic” 
ensued, causing school districts from around the nation to implement zero 
tolerance policies in an effort to secure their schools.31 Developed from the policies 
behind the Gun Free School Zone Act of 1994, aimed at keeping guns out of 
schools, zero tolerance policies called for “automatic discipline” every time a 
student committed a prohibited behavior, whether intentional or not.32 Zero 
tolerance policies stripped school administrators of discretion in discipline 
                                                      
27 Nance, supra note 10, at 936–40 (explaining that students have limited due process 
and privacy rights in schools). 
28 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332–33 n.2, 341 (1985) (“We join the majority 
of courts that have examined this issue in concluding that the accommodation of the 
privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators 
for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the 
requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the 
search has violated or is violating the law.”); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975) 
(holding that while students have a property right in their education, school administrators 
considering suspending students for misbehavior meet due process requirements when they 
provide notice by telling the student what they did wrong and provide a hearing by giving 
the student a chance to explain her side of the story before suspending the student); see also 
Jensen v. Reeves, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1275 (D. Utah 1999), aff’d, 3 F. App’x 905 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (discussing what process is due to students who claim an injury to their 
reputation).  
29 The paternalistic parens patriae doctrine understands that the state as the sovereign 
should care for “persons under a legal disability . . . who cannot take care of themselves.” 
Coupet, supra note 21, at 1308 (citations omitted).  
30 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966); Illinois ex rel. O’Connell v. 
Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 286–87 (1870); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 
104, 109 (1909). The paradox that “juveniles are different” informs this tension. See 
Coupet, supra note 21, at 1306. While our justice system has come to understand that 
juveniles are entitled to many of the same constitutional rights as adults, it has also come to 
understand that juveniles should not be treated the same as adults for purposes of 
sentencing. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 39–
58 (1967). 
31 Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime 
Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 540–41 (2013).  
32 REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 24. 
1066 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
practices.33 In practice, these zero tolerance policies lead to a “one strike and 
you’re out” discipline regime where students were automatically suspended or 
expelled for behaviors that “previously would have been dealt with through after-
school detentions, withdrawal of privileges, counseling, mediation,” or other 
methods that did not automatically remove a student from the classroom.34    
Three common goals behind the implementation of zero tolerance policies 
are: deterring bad behavior, incapacitating dangerous students, and maintaining 
consistency in punishment between members of different racial groups.35 
Unfortunately, “[d]ata indicates that harsh discipline and zero tolerance have 
resulted in the exclusion of more students without actually deterring or improving 
student behavior.”36 Zero tolerance policies result in more discipline, causing more 
students to be excluded from school and raising the rate of re-offense for students 
punished under zero tolerance policies.37 Additionally, the practical effect of zero 
tolerance policies is that minorities are disproportionately referred “for subjective 
misbehavior, like noise, disruption, and disrespect.”38 These zero tolerance policies 
contribute to the disproportionate effect of the STPP on students of color,39 
students with disabilities,40 and, some argue, LGBTQ students.41  
Zero tolerance policies have not worked as intended.42 Instead, they fuel the 
STPP.43 Critics of zero tolerance policies also argue that they violate students’ 
                                                      
33 Id. (“A zero tolerance approach limited discretion, though research eventually 
revealed that discretion continued and the approach was not especially effective.”).  
34 Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, One Strike and You’re Out? Constitutional 
Constraints on Zero Tolerance in Public Education, 81 WASH. U. L. REV. 65, 68–69 
(2003). 
35 Id. at 75–87.  
36 Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 MINN. 
L. REV. 823, 838 (2015). 
37 Id. at 838–39; see also A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1138–41, 1152 (10th Cir. 
2016) (holding that a SRO had probable cause to arrest, handcuff, and detain a student for 
burping in class, and the SRO was entitled to qualified immunity).  
38 Black, supra note 36, at 840.  
39 Nance, supra note 10, at 957 (discussing how the U.S. Department of Education’s 
Office of Civil Rights Data Collection demonstrates the disproportionate impact that zero 
tolerance policies have had on African American students).  
40 ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARV. UNIV., 
OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND 




41 Elizabethe C. Payne & Melissa J. Smith, LGBTQ Bullying: Zero Tolerance Is Not 
the Answer, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
elizabethe-c-payne/lgbtq-bullying-zero-toler_b_8307222.html [https://perma.cc/VVT2-
YWWA].  
42 Holder, supra note 5 (discussing how the zero tolerance policies have not served 
their purpose, but have contributed to juvenile incarceration); U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & 
U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., JOINT “DEAR COLLEAGUE” LETTER (Jan. 8, 2014) [hereinafter DEAR 
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substantive and procedural due process rights, and should be invalidated because 
they automatically impose punishment without evaluating individualized concerns. 
44 Few courts have invalidated zero tolerance policies on the constitutional grounds 
that mandatory suspension or expulsion provisions are not “rationally related to 
any legitimate state interest.”45 Instead, where a student’s rights are unclear, 
discipline practices have been protected, and school administrators have been 
granted qualified immunity.46  
Until advocates for students who suffer the consequences of zero tolerance 
policies can successfully invalidate those policies on constitutional grounds, 
students will shed their constitutional right at the schoolhouse gate, making them 
much more vulnerable to the STPP.47  
 
(b)  Students’ Limited Due Process Rights at School 
 
Courts have limited the procedural and substantive due process rights of 
students at school by “reducing disciplinary hearings to a sham” that are 
“hardly . . . sufficient to protect . . . against deprivation by pretext.”48  
In Goss v. Lopez,49 the Supreme Court held that students have a legitimate 
property interest in their education.50 The Goss court explained that this “property 
                                                                                                                                          
COLLEAGUE] (explaining that current discipline policies have been discriminatory in 
nature, federal law prohibits “discriminating in the administration of student discipline,” 
and making recommendations for better school discipline practices).  
43 Holder, supra note 5; DEAR COLLEAGUE, supra note 42 (“Studies have suggested a 
correlation between exclusionary discipline policies and practices and an array of serious 
educational, economic, and social problems, including school avoidance and diminished 
educational engagement; decreased academic achievement; increased behavior problems; 
increased likelihood of dropping out; substance abuse; and involvement with juvenile 
justice systems.”); REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 24–40 (evaluating data to explain 
how zero tolerance policies have contributed to the school to prison pipeline).   
44 Black, supra note 36, at 900 (arguing that the mandatory imposition of penalties 
under zero tolerance regimes violates substantive and procedural due process rights 
because “due process prohibits decision-makers from deciding students’ fates in advance, 
and requires that they listen to what the students say, deliberate the facts, and determine 
whether further information is necessary before making a decision.”).   
45 Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2000).  
46 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 378 (2009).  
47 But see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) 
(maintaining that students do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse 
gate.”).  
48 Black, supra note 36, at 855 (quoting J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Goss v. Lopez: The 
Supreme Court as School Superintendent, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 25, 30 (1975)); Nance, supra 
note 10, at 939–40. 
49 419 U.S. 565 (1975).  
50 Id. at 574 (holding that students have a “legitimate entitlement to a public education 
as a property interest”); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) 
(explaining that education, “where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which 
must be made available to all on equal terms.”).  
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interest” is protected by the “Due Process Clause and . . . may not be taken away 
for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by that 
Clause.”51 The Goss court explained that a student is deprived of his property 
interest in education when he is suspended without due process’s “rudimentary 
precautions” of notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to present his side of the 
story.52 These must be afforded the student to safeguard against “unfair or 
mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school.”53  
In applying this rule, the Goss court held that notice and the hearing can occur 
simultaneously; the hearing can be an informal discussion with the student and the 
student must “be told what he is accused of doing.”54 However, the court provided 
that there are some situations “in which prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted 
upon.”55 The Goss court explained that when schools believe a student’s “presence 
poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting 
the academic process,” that student may be removed immediately without notice or 
a hearing.56  
This exception to the due process requirements imposed by the court 
effectively permits any school official to extrajudicially determine that a student is 
not due the “rudimentary precautions” of notice, hearing, and an opportunity to 
present his side of the story before suspension or expulsion. Even if the school 
officials grant students notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to be heard, these 
proceedings do not need to be “deliberative, collaborative, or aimed at accuracy, 
justice, or helping the student.”57 Instead, these proceedings become a sham, or a 
“routine hoop through which a school must jump to produce a favored result.”58 
The minimal due process protections afforded students, the least powerful party in 
the student-administrator dynamic, are too weak to protect students from being 
funneled into the STPP.  
 
(c)  Students’ Limited Privacy Rights at School 
 
Students’ privacy rights are weakened the moment they enter the 
schoolhouse.59 In an effort to “promote safety and discipline within schools,” 
courts have “weakened students’ Fourth Amendment rights” in four main ways.60 
First, the Supreme Court’s ruling in New Jersey v. T.L.O.61 weakened 
students’ reasonable expectation of privacy when at the schoolhouse.62 The T.L.O. 
                                                      
51 Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.  
52 Id. at 581.  
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 582.  
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 582–83.  
57 Nance, supra note 10, at 939–40. 
58 Id.; Black, supra note 36, at 855.  
59 See Developments in the Law, supra note 16, at 1748–54.  
60 Nance, supra note 10, at 937. 
61 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
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decision made it so that school officials do not have to obtain a warrant or probable 
cause before conducting a search.63  
Second, in Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of 
Pottowatomie County v. Earls,64 the Supreme Court held that schools do not need 
individualized suspicion to conduct invasive drug tests on students involved in the 
school’s extracurricular activities.65 The Earls court found the mandatory drug 
tests reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “special needs” analysis because the 
school district’s interest in preventing and deterring drug use outweighed the 
invasiveness of the drug testing requirement.66 The Earls court explained that it 
applied the “special needs” analysis where a search does not need to be supported 
by probable cause, because the “probable-cause requirement” is impracticable in 
public schools, where “Fourth Amendment rights . . . are different . . . than 
elsewhere.”67 Instead of requiring school administrators to proffer probable cause 
before searching a student, the Supreme Court lowered the standard to reasonable 
suspicion, explaining that the threshold inquiry for this standard is whether there is 
a “moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.”68 
Third, courts have permitted schools to “rely on intense surveillance methods 
to maintain order and control” at school.69 Many schools are permitted “to use 
metal detectors, search through students’ lockers, monitor students with 
surveillance cameras, and conduct random drug testing on students.”70  
Fourth, although they may be subject to criminal penalties, students are not 
guaranteed the same protections afforded in criminal procedure.71 In T.L.O, the 
assistant vice principal conducted a search of a student’s purse after someone 
reported that the student was smoking cigarettes in the bathroom.72 During the 
search of the student’s purse, the assistant vice principal found rolling papers and 
marijuana.73 After conducting this warrantless search and discovering the 
                                                                                                                                          
62 See id. at 333.  
63 Id. at 340–41.  
64 536 U.S. 822 (2002).  
65 Id. at 838. 
66 Id. at 829, 836–38.  
67 Id. at 829–30 (internal citations omitted).  
68 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370–71 (2009).  
69 Nance, supra note 10, at 937.  
70 Id. at 937–38; see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 838 (“Within the limits of the Fourth 
Amendment, local school boards must assess the desirability of drug testing 
schoolchildren.”); United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Video 
surveillance does not itself violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Hough v. 
Shakopee Pub. Sch., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104 (D. Minn. 2009) (“An otherwise valid 
administrative search—for instance, a search for weapons with a metal detector—will not 
necessarily become invalid just because the results of the search are turned over to the 
police.”); State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 150 (Iowa 2003) (upholding the search of a 
student’s locker). 
71 Nance, supra note 10, at 937–38.  
72 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985).  
73 Id.  
1070 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
marijuana, the assistant vice principal notified and turned the evidence over to the 
police.74 The State brought criminal charges against the student, and while the 
student protested that the evidence was obtained through an unreasonable search, 
the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the search as reasonable.75  
In addition to weakened Fourth Amendment rights, courts have also 
weakened students’ Fifth Amendment protections. For example, courts 
“consistently hold that a school official may question a student without providing 
Miranda warnings, regardless of the possibility that the school official might later 
refer that student to law enforcement for wrongdoing.”76 The logical consequence 
of weakening students’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections is that school 
officials will be more likely to discover incriminating evidence because students 
will be more likely to “fess up” without knowing that mandatory reporting 
requirements77 will require school officials to report incriminating evidence to law 
enforcement. This evidence will be provided to prosecutors, even though it was 
“obtained under circumstances that would render such evidence inadmissible if 
seized from an adult or a juvenile outside of the school context.”78 Rather than 
protecting students, and setting them up to succeed, weakening their Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment rights pushes more students into the STPP, where they are set up 
to fail.79  
 
(d)  In Loco Parentis, Qualified Immunity, and Mandatory Reporting 
 
While the rights of students in public schools have been restricted, teachers 
and administrators have been given broader in loco parentis roles,80 and are often 
granted qualified immunity when sued by students for constitutional violations.81 
                                                      
74 Id. at 328–29.  
75 Id. at 329, 347.  
76 Nance, supra note 10, at 938. 
77 See id. at 934–36. 
78 Id. at 939.  
79 Id.  
80 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 840 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(explaining that the common law doctrine of in loco parentis, which weakens a student’s 
privacy rights, enables a public school to “adequately . . . carry out its responsibilities” of 
safety); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–55 (1995) (explaining that the 
State’s power over students in public schools was “custodial and tutelary, permitting a 
degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.”); see also 1 
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *453 (1753) (explaining that 
a parent can “delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or 
schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power 
of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be 
necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.”).  
81 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009) (“A school 
official searching a student is entitled to qualified immunity where clearly established law 
does not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.”) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
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These legal protections for teachers and administrators dealing with safety and 
discipline enable them to discover zero tolerance and criminal violations by 
students.82 Once aware of criminal violations, some mandatory reporting statutes 
require teachers and administrators to turn the student in to the SRO stationed at 
the school, or to local police.83 The cumulative effect of weakening students’ 
rights, strengthening teachers’ and administrators’ disciplinary authority, and 
stripping teachers and administrators of discretion with zero tolerance policies and 
mandatory reporting statutes funnels more students into the STPP.84  
Two Supreme Court cases held that teachers and administrators hold in loco 
parentis roles at school. In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,85 the court held 
that schools’ in loco parentis role expanded their powers to supervise and control 
students in a way that  “could not be exercised over free adults.”86 Relying on their 
reasoning in Vernonia, the Supreme Court in Earls held that schools’ in loco 
parentis powers gave them power “adequately to carry out [their] responsibilities” 
of safety, thereby diminishing student’s privacy rights.87 These cases contributed to 
a regime in schools that grants school officials in loco parentis rights that value 
safety and discipline over students’ rights. Similar to the parens patriae power of 
state actors to care for “persons under a legal disability . . . who cannot take care of 
themselves,”88 this broadly paternalistic in loco parentis power can produce bias 
and abuse when unchecked by rights.89  
Additionally, the promise of qualified immunity for teachers and 
administrators minimizes whatever deterrent effect the threat of civil suits poses. In 
Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding,90 a school official conducted a 
strip search on a thirteen-year-old girl who was suspected of possessing pills that 
were prohibited under a zero tolerance policy.91 Even though the court found the 
search unreasonable, the Redding court found the school official was entitled to 
qualified immunity because the thirteen-year-old student’s right to be free from a 
                                                      
82 See id. at 371, 377–79 (holding that a school official was entitled to qualified 
immunity even though he conducted an unreasonable search on a student to discover 
whether she had violated one of the school’s zero tolerance prohibitions); Vernonia, 515 
U.S. at 650–51, 654–55 (explaining that the school’s in loco parentis role contributed to the 
holding that the school’s urinalysis test designed to test the presence of illegal drugs was 
reasonable).  
83 See Nance, supra note 10, at 934–36 (describing state mandatory reporting statutes 
that require school officials to report criminal acts). 
84 See id. at 929–45.  
85 515 U.S. 646 (1995).  
86 Id. at 654–55.  
87 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 840 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
88 Coupet, supra note 21, at 1308 (citations omitted).  
89 See Henning, supra note 21, at 426–30; cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967) 
(“[U]nbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute 
for principle and procedure.”).  
90 557 U.S. 364 (2009).  
91 Id. at 371, 374–75. 
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strip search was not “clearly established” at the time.92 In addition to the protection 
of qualified immunity afforded school officials, many states have statues creating 
immunity for school officials who report “offenses to law enforcement in good 
faith.”93  
Federal and statewide mandatory reporting laws require teachers and 
administrators to report criminal activity observed within the school.94 Under the 
Gun-Free Schools Act, “virtually every school district [in the nation] is required to 
have a policy in place that compels school officials to refer students who bring 
weapons to school to law enforcement.”95 On a statewide level, “twenty-six states 
require school officials to refer students to law enforcement for incidents relating 
to controlled substances, fifteen states require referral for offenses involving 
alcohol, eight states mandate referral for theft, nine states for vandalism of school 
property, and eleven states for robbery without using a weapon.”96 Depending on 
the violation, many states impose a criminal penalty on school officials for not 
reporting, and provide immunity for school officials when they do report.97  
Coupled with the promise of qualified immunity, teachers’ and 
administrators’ in loco parentis rights empower them with broad disciplinary 
authority over students. With broader authority to investigate than prosecutors or 
police officers outside the academic environment, and with weaker due process 
and privacy protections for students, teachers and administrators are more likely to 
discover zero tolerance violations or criminal activity that they are likely to be 
statutorily required to report. This imbalance of power, unequal distribution of 
rights, and stripping of disciplinary discretion fuels the STPP.   
 
2.  Policing the Schools with School Resource Officers 
 
Although very few studies demonstrate whether SROs make schools safer, the 
presence of law enforcement in schools has risen from a few hundred nationwide 
in the 1970s to over 19,000 in 2007.98 SROs were placed in schools to make them 
safer, yet studies suggest that their presence in schools has contributed instead to 
                                                      
92 Id. at 377–79.  
93 Nance, supra note 10, at 936.  
94 See id. at 934–36.  
95 Id. at 934; see 20 U.S.C. § 7961(h)(1) (2015) (“No funds shall be made available 
under any subchapter of this chapter to any local educational agency unless such agency 
has a policy requiring referral to the criminal justice or juvenile delinquency system of any 
student who brings a firearm or weapon to a school served by such agency.”).  
96 Nance, supra note 10, at 935.  
97 Id. at 935–36.  
98 Id. at 946–48; see also Amanda Merkwae, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, 
and the Conduct of School Resource Officers, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 147, 157–59 (2015) 
(discussing the influx of School Resource Officers, the reasons for the trend, and the mixed 
results as to whether SROs increase school safety).  
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the overcriminalization of students’ misbehavior, thereby fueling the STPP.99 
Three factors contribute to this phenomenon: the implicit bias of decisionmakers 
with discretionary powers,100 insufficient training of SROs,101 and the misuse of 
SROs for resolving noncriminal behavioral problems.102   
 
(a)  Implicit Bias in Discretionary Arrests 
 
One of the most alarming characteristics of the STPP is the disproportionate 
rate at which students of color, students with disabilities, and LGBTQ students are 
disciplined or referred to law enforcement by school officials for discretionary 
violations.103 Once referred to law enforcement, students from these groups are 
more likely to be criminalized.104 Researchers point to implicit bias as one of the 
unintended but primary factors causing this disproportionality.105 Studies 
demonstrate how “[r]ace plays a role in SROs’ perceptions of situations involving 
youth and can influence split-second decisions related to culpability and whether 
an arrest is necessary.”106 In this sense, race likely plays a role in teachers’, school 
administrators’, and SROs’ decisions to either penalize a student who “violated a 
discretionary law,” or just “give a warning.”107 Since “[m]any—if not most—of the 
critical decisions impacting young people along the educational pipeline are 
discretionary individual decisions,” implicit bias is one of the major contributing 
factors to the differential treatment of students.108  
                                                      
99 REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 51–54; Nance, supra note 10, at 945–52; 
Merkwae, supra note 98, at 157–59.  
100 REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 54; Nance, supra note 10, at 942–43; 
Merkwae, supra note 98, at 169.  
101 REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 54; Nance, supra note 10, at 950–51; 
Merkwae, supra note 98, at 161–63.  
102 REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 53–54; Nance, supra note 10, at 949–50; 
Merkwae, supra note 98, at 164, 168.  
103 REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 54–55; see also Merkwae, supra note 98, at 
168 (explaining that “SRO discretion in deciding whether to make an arrest” may be a 
cause of the trend that “students of color and students with disabilities bear a 
disproportionate risk for being criminalized at school”); FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 
1–5 (finding that a lack of criteria for guiding discretionary decisions lead to disparate 
outcomes for youth along racial and geographical lines).  
104 See REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 27, 30–31, 37, 39, 41–47; FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 11, at 1–5; Merkwae, supra note 98, at 168–72. 
105 REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 54–55.   
106 Merkwae, supra note 98, at 169. 
107 Id.; see also id. at 54 (explaining that minority students are “disproportionately 
affected”). 
108 REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 55; see also Melinda D. Anderson, When 
School Feels Like Prison, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
education/archive/2016/09/when-school-feels-like-prison/499556/ [https://perma.cc/4DZN-
GAQM] (explaining a study that demonstrates how “campuses with larger populations of 
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(b)  Training School Resource Officers 
 
While SROs are injected into schools with the hope that they will make the 
schools safer, few SROs are provided with training on how to work with youth.109 
Although the National Association of School Resource Officers (“NASRO”), a 
nonprofit founded in 1991, offers and encourages SRO-specific training,110 very 
few jurisdictions require the SROs in their schools to attend such training.111 In 
2015, only twelve states had laws requiring SROs to have training; however, the 
training requirements are inconsistent across the twelve states.112 Although 
“[s]ome states mandate training on how to respond to an active shooter,” few focus 
on “dealing with children differently than adults.”113 Furthermore, in 2012, “most 
police academies d[id] not teach recruits about research on adolescent psychology 
and behavior.”114 According to the United States Department of Justice, the lack of 
substantive SRO training on child psychology, de-escalation, and children with 
disabilities contributes to the STPP and may give rise to valid civil rights claims.115   
Proponents of SRO training suggest that the training should emphasize 
teaching SROs that their role is safety not discipline,116 de-escalation techniques if 
they get involved in safety issues,117 how to specifically work with children,118 and 
how to work with students who have disabilities.119 Without this training, SROs’ 
decisions “to arrest a student” are more likely to be “based on criteria that are 
wholly distinct from and even anathema to the best interests of the student or the 
school as a whole.”120  
  
                                                                                                                                          
students of color are more likely to use harsh surveillance techniques,” sending a message 
to students that “white children have greater privacy rights than nonwhite children.”).  
109 Merkwae, supra note 98, at 162–63.  
110 About NASRO, NASRO, https://nasro.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/LHF7-BB9A] 
(last visited July 26, 2017). 
111 Mark Keierleber, Why So Few School Cops Are Trained to Work with Kids, THE 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/11/why-do-
most-school-cops-have-no-student-training-requirements/414286/ [https://perma.cc/LT2A-
BLLR].  
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Id. 
115 Statement of Interest of the United States at 11–12, 14–15, S.R. v. Kenton Cty., 
(No. 2:15-CV-143), 2015 WL 10058699 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 2, 2015).  
116 Keierleber, supra note 111. 
117 Id.  
118 Nance, supra note 10, at 949–50.  
119 Keierleber, supra note 111. 
120 Nance, supra note 10, at 951.  
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(c)  Blurred Lines: Using School Resource Officers for Discipline, Not 
Safety 
 
SROs were injected into the nation’s public schools in an effort to ensure that 
our schools remained safe.121 Since most of these SROs were not provided with 
SRO-specific training and few had clearly defined roles within their schools,122 
SROs came to be used as disciplinarians by teachers and school administrators.123 
The lines between what was a disciplinary issue and what was a safety or a 
criminal issue became blurred.124 The practical effect of flooding our schools with 
untrained and unhinged SROs was the over criminalization of student behavior, the 
STPP.125  
The U.S. Department of Justice’s Investigation of the Ferguson Police 
Department yields insight into this phenomenon:  
 
SROs told us that they viewed increased arrests in the schools as a 
positive result of their work. This perspective suggests a failure of 
training (including training in mental health, counseling, and the 
development of the teenage brain); a lack of priority given to de-
escalation and conflict resolution; and insufficient appreciation for the 
negative educational and long-term outcomes that can result from 
treating disciplinary concerns as crimes and using force on students.126 
 
Absent job descriptions that “clearly define the SROs’ role or limit SRO 
involvement in cases of routine discipline or classroom management,”127 SROs 
became more likely to intervene when they observed students “being disruptive 
and disorderly . . . because they view this as one of their duties, even when those 
duties overlap with the traditional duties of school officials.”128 When it is unclear 
                                                      
121 Merkwae, supra note 98, at 163.  
122 See Keierleber, supra note 111, at 3–5; Merkwae, supra note 98, at 162–64.  
123 CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 37 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
F9WX-UEN9] (finding that the Ferguson Missouri Police treated “routine discipline issues 
as criminal matters”) [hereinafter DOJ, FERGUSON].  
124 See id.; Merkwae, supra note 98, at 162–64 (explaining that “when sworn police 
officers are provided with unique access to students and are given disciplinary authority by 
school administrators, it is not always clear where administrators’ disciplinary roles stop 
and police powers begin.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
125 See DOJ, FERGUSON, supra note 123, at 38; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 
51–54.  
126 DOJ, FERGUSON, supra note 123, at 38.  
127 Id. at 37.  
128 Nance, supra note 10, at 949–50.  
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“where administrators’ disciplinary roles stop and police powers begin,”129 benign 
student behavior is more likely to be criminalized.130  
The broad power of SROs to criminalize behavior, the automatic suspension 
or expulsion with zero tolerance policies, the mandatory reporting statutes, and the 
protections afforded school administrators greatly overpower the weakened rights 
protecting students. This imbalance of power is at the root of the STPP. If schools 
must inject SROs into the academic setting, automatically suspend or expel 
students for zero tolerance violations, require school officials to discover and 
report criminal violations, and weaken students’ constitutional rights, then they 
need to reconsider their methods of punishment and reeducate those in charge of 
punishment. These are two easy steps schools can take to minimize the effect the 
STPP has on our nation’s children. 
 
B.  Utah’s Attempt at Juvenile Justice Reform 
 
The major contributing factors to the STPP outlined in this Note are zero 
tolerance policies,131 the limited constitutional rights of students,132 the police 
power of school administrators,133 and the injection of SROs into the academic 
environment without clear job responsibilities and training.134 To address the 
causes and effects of the STPP, researchers focusing on this problem have 
recommended: expanding the legal protections for juveniles;135 refraining from 
using SROs for disciplinary issues;136 clearly distinguishing educator and 
administrator disciplinary responsibilities from SRO responsibilities;137 retraining 
SROs to better understand the effects of the STPP on youth and how to work with 
youth populations, minority populations, students with disabilities, and LGBTQ 
                                                      
129 Merkwae, supra note 98, at 162–64.  
130 See DOJ, FERGUSON, supra note 123, at 37; Statement of Interest of the United 
States at 11, S.R. v. Kenton Cty., (No. 2:15-CV-143), 2015 WL 10058699 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 
2, 2015); cf. DEAR COLLEAGUE, supra note 42 (recommending training and professional 
development for all school personnel, the appropriate use of school resource officers, and 
the use of restorative justice practices).  
131 See supra Part A.1.(a). 
132 See supra Part A.1.(b)–(c). 
133 See supra Part A.1.(d). 
134 See supra Part A.2.  
135 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 15; Fox, supra note 16, at 1236 (arguing that 
there will be no revolution in juvenile justice until juveniles are granted the right to 
counsel); REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 12; Developments in the Law, supra note 
16, at 1763–69 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment protections afforded students should 
be modified); cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1967) (“Juvenile Court history has again 
demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a 
poor substitute for principle and procedure.”). 
136 See ALBERS ET AL., supra note 11, at 4, 20; JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 
17, at 31; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 12–13.  
137 See REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 13; PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 6.  
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students;138 adopting restorative justice practices along with other evidence based 
alternatives to the juvenile justice system;139 and reforming the discretionary power 
of state actors to cite, refer, and sentence youth within the juvenile justice 
system.140 
Over the last two years, Utah has attempted to implement some of these 
recommendations by passing three new laws that regulate SROs, expand the legal 
protections afforded juveniles, and guide the exercise of discretion throughout the 
juvenile justice system. While these reforms make important steps in addressing 
Utah’s STPP, they do not eliminate the potential for the bias and abuse of 
discretion that contribute to, and the disparate outcomes manifested in, Utah’s 
STPP. 
 
1.  Utah’s School Resource Officers Law 
 
In June of 2014, Dr. Moises Prospero submitted the DMC Evidence-Based, 
Best Practices Intervention Report (Intervention Report) to the Utah Board of 
Juvenile Justice Disproportionate Minority Contact Subcommittee (“DMC 
subcommittee”).141 Utah’s DMC subcommittee is “tasked with addressing the 
overrepresentation of minority youth in the juvenile justice system” and aims “to 
eliminate the disproportionate representation of minority youth at all points of 
contact in the juvenile justice system.”142 Prospero’s Intervention Report 
recommended creating written agreements between SROs and school districts that 
outlined SRO responsibilities, the development of SRO-specific training programs, 
and the use of diversion programs; or alternatives to the juvenile justice system, 
like peer courts.143 Two years later, Sandra Hollins, the first African American 
                                                      
138 See ALBERS ET AL., supra note 11, at 20–21; FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 9; 
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 17, at 32; PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 6–7; 
REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 12–13.    
139 See ALBERS ET AL., supra note 11, at 6, 22; FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 12–
13; PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 6; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 13. For a 
discussion on restorative justice, see infra Part B.2.(a). 
140 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 12–21; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 
13. See generally Coupet, supra note 21, at 1341–46 (arguing for guiding discretion 
towards the use of individualized, restorative justice based, justice for youth offenders); 
Henning, supra note 21, at 436–61 (arguing that reforming prosecutorial decision-making 
in the juvenile justice system could reduce the racial disparities in the juvenile justice 
system).  
141 PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 1. 
142 What Is DMC Committee?, UTAH BOARD JUVENILE JUST., 
https://justice.utah.gov/Juvenile/ubjj_dmc.html [https://perma.cc/U286-KXDS] (last visited 
July 26, 2017). The Utah Board of Juvenile Justice is a wing of the Utah Commission on 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice. Id.   
143 PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 6–7.  
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woman to be elected to the Utah State Legislature,144 sponsored the “School 
Resource Officers” bill (“SRO Law”) that included Prospero’s recommendations 
when it was signed into law on March 22, 2016.145 
 
(a)  Training School Resource Officers 
 
The “School Resource Officer” training section of the SRO Law requires the 
State Board of Education to create and “make available a training program for 
school principals and school resource officers.”146 In creating the training program, 
the State Board of Education is required to “work in conjunction with the State 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice . . . solicit input from local school 
boards . . . and consider the current United States Department of Education 
recommendations on school discipline and the role of a school resource officer.”147 
The law also includes recommended topics for the training, but does not make any 
of the topics mandatory. Among the suggested topics are: training on childhood 
development; how to appropriately respond to students and disabled students; de-
escalation and conflict resolution techniques; cultural awareness; restorative justice 
practices; identifying whether a student has been exposed to trauma and how to 
make appropriate referrals for that student; student privacy rights; the negative 
consequences associated with injecting youth into the juvenile and criminal justice 
system; strategies to reduce youth involvement in the justice system; and the 
distinctions between the roles and responsibilities of SROs and school 
administrators.148 
 
(b)  Defining School Resource Officers’ Responsibilities 
 
The section of the “School Resource Officers” law that discusses the 
contractual relationship between law enforcement agencies and local education 
agencies requires the contract to include provisions that will help minimize the 
misuse of SROs.149 Under this law, contracts between law enforcement agencies 
and local education agencies must include language that requires SROs to 
“emphasize the use of restorative approaches to address negative behavior.”150 The 
contract must also describe the responsibilities of the SROs and the school 
administrators to “maintain safe schools . . . and support educational opportunities 
                                                      
144 Lee Davidson, Black Politicians Beat Odds in Utah, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 5, 
2015), http://www.sltrib.com/news/2021834-155/black-politicians-beat-odds-in-utah 
[https://perma.cc/8YRD-4VH6].  
145 H.B. 460, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016); see UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11-
1601, 1602, 1603, 1604 (2016).  
146 UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-1603 (2016).  
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. § 1604. 
150 Id. 
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for students.”151 The contract shall include detailed language designating the 
“student offenses that the SRO shall confer with” school administrators to resolve, 
including offenses that are “administrative issues that an SRO shall refer to a 
school administrator for resolution.”152 The law mandates that contracts must 
contain “a detailed description of the rights of a student under state and federal 
law,” regarding searches, questioning, and privacy.153 Finally, contracts must 
include “training requirements,” and one of those requirements is that the SRO and 
the school principal “jointly complete the SRO training” designed by the State 
Board of Education.154   
 
(c)  Utah’s SRO Law Addresses the Misuse of SROs and the Abuse of 
Student Rights 
 
If implemented successfully, the SRO Law could address the causes of Utah’s 
STPP in five ways. First, by requiring SROs and school principals to attend the 
SRO training together,155 the SRO Law creates a critical dialogue between law 
enforcement agencies and local education agencies about how SROs should be 
used, how they can be used, and where the line is between an SRO’s and a school 
administrator’s responsibilities. Until the SRO Law was enacted, this was not done 
on a broad scale in Utah.156 While this dialogue is an important first step towards 
reforming how students are disciplined at school—the entry point to the STPP—
the effectiveness of this dialogue will depend on the trainer, the SROs, and the 
school administrators in attendance. 
Second, although the SRO Law does not mandate any of the training topics it 
lists, it does limit the range of SRO training topics to the list it provides.157 These 
topics could enable SROs to mitigate the effects of the STPP on students in their 
schools. For example, learning how the adolescent mind works, how to respond 
age appropriately to students, how to work with disabled students, or what is 
considered normal behavior in different cultural contexts would aid an SRO in 
differentiating between behavioral and criminal issues.158 Learning de-escalation 
and conflict resolution techniques could help an SRO to prevent minor infractions 
from becoming major criminal violations. Learning about restorative justice 
practices could enable SROs to divert students from the juvenile justice system 
when they committed minor infractions at school.159 Furthermore, learning about 





155 Id. § 1603. 
156 See PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 3.  
157 UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-1603 (2016).  
158 See supra text accompanying notes 96–98. 
159 See supra text accompanying note 108; PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 6–7 
(recommending peer courts, which are restorative in nature, as alternatives to the juvenile 
justice system).  
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the long-term negative consequences associated with youth involvement in the 
juvenile justice system could encourage an SRO to consider how best to serve 
youth before citing and referring a youth to the juvenile justice system.160  
An SRO armed with the knowledge and insight from each of these topics 
could address the bias and abuse of discretion that often cause students to be 
funneled into the STPP. However, like the deferential “with all deliberate speed” 
language from Brown II, the fact that the SRO Law’s training language is not 
mandatory could be a shortcoming that permits those with local control to 
undermine the purpose of the training program.161 
Third, by requiring that law enforcement agencies and local education 
agencies enter into a contract defining the roles and responsibilities of SROs and 
school administrators, school administrators and SROs will be less likely to 
exercise unnecessary police power over students. Instead, when a school 
administrator or an SRO believes a student’s behavior has risen to the level of 
criminal, the SRO and the school administrator can confer to determine who 
should take responsibility. If they disagree, or they do not know, they can reference 
their contract. If implemented properly, the practical effect of having a contract 
that clearly defines where SROs’ responsibilities begin and end could be that fewer 
students are criminalized for benign behavioral missteps.162 
Although this development is promising, any anticipated positive results 
could be undermined by ambiguous or unenforced contracts between law 
enforcement agencies and local education agencies. By granting local agencies the 
discretion to create their own contracts, the SRO Law risks the possibility that 
some communities may not work to combat the overcriminalization of adolescent 
behavior.  
Fourth, the SRO Law requires all contracts to include affirmative 
requirements for SRO services.163 Under this section of the SRO Law, SROs are 
required to collaborate with school administrators to solve problems and 
emphasize the use of restorative, not punitive, practices for resolving negative 
student behavior.164 Under the SRO Law, when a student violates a rule or a law, 
SROs must try to resolve the problem with school administrators using restorative 
practices.165 If implemented properly, problems would be dealt with in-house 
before the student is referred to the juvenile justice system. This will divert 
students from the juvenile justice system, causing fewer students to be funneled 
into the STPP.  
While this affirmative requirement in the SRO Law has the potential to 
address abuse of discretion by way of resisting a change in SRO practices, it fails 
to use carrots or sticks to incentivize compliance. Absent statutory incentives, like 
                                                      
160 See supra text accompanying note 99. 
161 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
162 See supra text accompanying notes 95, 102–108. 
163 UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-1604 (2016). 
164 Id. 
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making SROs responsible for educational outcomes, these affirmative 
requirements could go unenforced. 
Finally, the SRO Law aims to protect students’ constitutional rights by 
encouraging a student rights section in the SRO training, and requiring that the 
contract between the law enforcement agency and the local education agency 
include a detailed description of students’ state and federal rights. With a detailed 
description of students’ rights in the SRO employment contract, SROs and school 
administrators should no longer be unaware of what rights a student has. They 
should know what procedures violate the student’s due process, privacy, and Fifth 
Amendment rights. If an established right is clearly defined in the contract, yet the 
SRO or the school administrator violates this right, it is possible that neither will 
have a valid claim for qualified immunity.166  
This section of the SRO Law has the potential to deter honest state actors 
against grossly violating students’ rights. However, the SRO Law creates no 
affirmative right for students to know what their rights are, or to enforce those 
rights. Absent these affirmative educational and process rights for students, this 
section of the bill fails to alter the balance of power between school officials 
(including SROs) and students. Instead, this section of the bill relies on the 
benevolence of school officials to act in students’ best interests. 
 
2.  Utah’s Juvenile Defense Law and Juvenile Justice Amendments 
 
On June 16, 2016, Utah’s Governor, Senate President, House Speaker, and 
Supreme Court Chief Justice “announced the formation of the interbranch Utah 
Juvenile Justice Working Group [to] conduct a data-driven examination of Utah’s 
juvenile justice system and issue a comprehensive set of policy recommendations” 
with the goals of “protecting public safety, holding youth accountable, containing 
costs, and improving outcomes for youth, families, and communities.”167 After 
months of “exhaustive review of quantitative information from Utah’s courts and 
juvenile corrections system” as well as “more than 30 roundtable discussions” with 
key stakeholders in the juvenile justice system, the Utah Juvenile Justice Working 
Group (“Working Group”) published its report in November, 2016.168  
The Working Group made four key findings relating directly to the STPP.169 
First, the Working Group found that a “lack of statewide standards leads to 
inconsistent responses and disparate outcomes throughout the juvenile justice 
system.”170 The “disparities based upon race and geography . . . for youth with 
                                                      
166 See supra text accompanying notes 66, 72–74, 94. 
167 Utah Leaders Announce Formation of Juvenile Justice Working Group, UTAH 
GOVERNOR GARY HERBERT (June 16, 2016), https://www.utah.gov/governor/news_media 
/article.html?article=20160616-1 [https://perma.cc/5WBU-VLPU]. 
168 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1.  
169 Id. at 1–2. 
170 Id. at 1. 
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similar offenses at every stage of the system” indicate that sentencing officers’ 
discretion produced biased results.171  
Second, “[a]ffordable, accessible services that effectively hold youth 
accountable and keep families intact are largely unavailable to the courts across the 
state.”172 While data shows that “early intervention, substance abuse treatment, and 
family services are in place and working effectively” in some districts, “the 
scarcity of services in the communit[ies] often leads to decisions that send lower-
level youth deeper into the justice system.”173  
Third, while detaining juveniles “costs up to 17 times more than community 
supervision,” it “results in similar rates of re-offending.”174 State actors frequently 
used their discretion to send juveniles to punitive detention programs that were 
more expensive and more likely to increase the risk of recidivism than alternatives 
to detention.175 These findings demonstrate that the discretionary powers of state 
actors were not always used in the child’s, the families’, the community’s, or the 
state’s best interests. Absent clear guidelines to guide state actors’ decisions and 
evidence-based diversion programs to serve juveniles, the power of discretion has 
been used to place juveniles in ineffective, expensive, and punitive programs.   
Finally, the Working Group found that “[m]ost youth do not receive legal 
representation throughout the duration of the court process, even when their liberty 
is at stake.”176 Without a legal advocate to demand the “constitutional 
domestication”177 of the juvenile courts, the parens patriae power of the state is left 
unchecked, and the fate of juveniles is in the hands of police officers, prosecutors, 
probation officers, and juvenile court judges.178 The Working Group’s findings 
indicate that Utah state actors have not always used their discretion in juveniles’ 
best interests, and most juveniles have had no legal representation to protect their 
constitutional rights and advocate for their best interests.179  
 
(a)  Protecting the Constitutional Rights of Juveniles 
 
In response to the Working Group’s findings, the Utah State Legislature 
passed S.B. 134, Indigent Defense Commission Amendments,180 during Utah’s 
2017 legislative session. The Indigent Defense Commission Amendments 
                                                      
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 2. 
173 Id. at 10. 
174 Id. at 1. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 2. 
177 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967) (explaining that expansion of procedural 
rights for juveniles was a necessary “constitutional domestication” of the juvenile courts).  
178 See Fox, supra note 16, at 1236–38 (explaining that “[a] conscientious and 
experienced judge will sometimes raise questions concerning possible defenses when the 
child is not represented by counsel”); Henning, supra note 21, at 426. 
179 FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1–2, 15. 
180 S.B. 134, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017).  
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(“Juvenile Defense Law”), hints at expanding the constitutional protections 
afforded juveniles in Utah by suggesting that counsel should be provided “at all 
stages” for “[i]ndigent parties in juvenile delinquency and child welfare 
proceedings.”181 While the Juvenile Defense Law does not directly provide for 
Parcounsel at all stages for indigent youth, or address how to keep students outside 
of the STPP, the law takes a baby step towards protecting the constitutional rights 
of students once they have been funneled into the STPP by recognizing the 
importance of counsel. However, as some have argued, “[t]he granting of 
procedural rights can hardly become a reality for children without lawyers to assert 
them on their behalf.”182 Without advocates to protect the rights of indigent youth, 
those youth will be more vulnerable to the bias and abuse of discretion that 
contribute to the disparate outcomes in Utah’s STPP.183  
 
(b)  Reforming the Discretionary Powers of State Actors 
 
Responding to the Working Group’s findings, the Utah State Legislature also 
passed H.B. 239, Juvenile Justice Amendments (the “Amendments”) during the 
2017 legislative session.184 In large part, the Amendments address the misuse of 
parens patriae power in Utah by guiding discretion using standards and procedures, 
the limitation of punitive options, and the expansion of evidence-based 
rehabilitative services.185  
First, the Amendments reformed how certain conduct was reported by 
narrowing what conduct could be reported to law enforcement, by expanding what 
offenses qualified for school-based interventions, and by requiring that minor 
school-based offenses were reported only to school-based diversion programs.186 
Second, the Amendments changed public school discipline policies by declaring 
when schools must refer minor school-based offenses to diversion programs.187  
These two changes should address the overcriminalization of adolescent 
behavior, and thereby diminish the flow of students into the STPP. Taking law 
enforcement officers out of the equation for school-based offenses makes sense 
from a rehabilitative standpoint. Law enforcement officers have training in 
identifying criminal behavior and addressing that behavior with punitive models. 
Despite the SRO Law, SROs throughout the state do not yet have training in child 
developmental psychology and addressing adolescent behavior with rehabilitative 
                                                      
181 Id.; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-804(1)(iv)(B) (2017). 
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techniques.188 Public school employees and school-based diversion programs do 
have this training. Placing a stronger burden on school officials and school-based 
diversion programs to use rehabilitative approaches in response to disruptive 
behavior addresses one of the primary causes of the STPP, the overcriminalization 
of adolescent behavior. 
Third, the Amendments limit the power of schools and juvenile courts to 
punish juveniles for “disruptive student behavior,” modifies the notice provisions 
for disruptive student behavior, and requires schools to use school-based problem 
solving interventions for disruptive behavior.189 This change limits the power of 
schools and juvenile courts to punish students for the vague offense of “disruptive 
student behavior.” By forcing schools to refer these offenses to problem solving 
diversion programs, this change addresses another cause of the STPP—zero-
tolerance-like catchall offenses—thereby increasing the likelihood that students 
will receive affordable rehabilitative treatment.  
Fourth, the Amendments removed the limitation that minors can only receive 
rehabilitative dispositions if it is their first violation of alcohol, drug paraphernalia, 
controlled substances, or prohibited acts charges.190 At most, this is a change in 
judicial discretion. While this change does not significantly narrow the state’s 
discretionary powers to punish youth for drug-related offenses, it does expand the 
state’s discretionary powers to give juveniles rehabilitative dispositions for those 
offenses.  
Fifth, the Amendments require Utah’s Commission on Criminal and Juvenile 
Justice (“CCJJ”) to study evidence-based community and diversion programs, 
develop training and guidelines for those programs, and, along with the Division of 
Juvenile Justice Services (“JJS”), expand their availability throughout the state.191 
Although this reform will take time to implement, it has the potential to be a 
crucial element of the Amendments. If the CCJJ can find evidence-based programs 
that will effectively rehabilitate, rather than punish, juveniles, JJS could offer these 
programs throughout the state. These programs would cost less, serve youth more 
effectively, and divert many youths from the STPP.192 However, this reform will 
be ineffective if the CCJJ does not find programs that work (i.e. programs that 
rehabilitate juveniles without disparate outcomes), if local communities reject the 
programs (i.e. abuse of discretion), or if JJS is not given the funding to implement 
these programs (resulting in disparate outcomes based on geography).  
                                                      
188 See discussion infra Parts A.2.(b), B.1.(a).  
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Sixth, the Amendments expand the criteria for when youth must be offered 
nonjudicial adjustments (i.e. diversion programs), strips the requirement that 
juveniles must admit guilt and waive their privilege against self-incrimination to 
obtain a nonjudicial adjustment, prohibits denial of nonjudicial adjustments if the 
juvenile cannot pay for the service, requires that fees adhere to a statewide sliding 
scale, and permits prosecutors to dismiss cases where juveniles fail to meet the 
conditions of their nonjudicial closure.193  
By expanding the requirements for offering nonjudicial adjustments with 
statutory criteria and a sliding scale for fees, the Amendments increase the 
likelihood that youth will receive rehabilitative dispositions. Additionally, 
eliminating the requirement that youth admit guilt and waive their privilege against 
self-incrimination before participating in a diversion program is one of the few 
ways the Amendments protect the constitutional rights of juveniles.  
Finally, the Amendments enable school boards to create and partner with 
certified youth court programs, permit referrals to youth courts for minor school-
based offenses, permit youth courts to take on juveniles referred for multiple minor 
offenses, and eliminate the requirement that juveniles waive their right to a speedy 
trial and their right against self-incrimination to participate in the program.194 
Protecting juveniles’ constitutional right to a speedy trial and privilege against 
self-incrimination in youth courts is a positive step that limits the parens patriae 
power of state actors in these diversion programs. Additionally, by enabling 
partnerships between schools and youth courts, these reforms make way for the 
proliferation of school-based restorative justice diversion programs throughout the 
state. Coupled with the requirement that school-based offenses are referred to 
diversion programs as well as the CCJJ’s mandate to study and expand the use of 
evidence-based diversion programs, this reform paves the way for an institutional 
shift in how Utah’s parens patriae power is administered in response to first time, 
low-risk juvenile offenders. However, this reform is limited because it is 
permissive rather than mandatory. If school boards and communities throughout 
Utah decide not to create youth court diversion programs, this reform will have no 
positive effect for the juveniles in those communities, resulting in no diversion-
program check on the bias and abuse of discretion associated with the STPP at the 
school level, and causing disparate outcomes based on geography.  
Utah’s Juvenile Justice Amendments, H.B. 239, made significant 
improvements to the juvenile justice system by limiting and guiding state actors’ 
powers of discretion throughout the system. However, in large part, the reforms 
either passed these powers of discretion to state actors with less punitive power 
(i.e. public school officials or diversion programs), or permitted juvenile court 
judges to exercise more discretion in deciding whether to send juveniles through 
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diversion programs. These reforms do little to address the bias and abuse of 
discretion that contribute to, and the disparate outcomes manifested in, Utah’s 
STPP. However, Utah can address these problems by using its existing network of 
youth courts to divert students from the STPP. 
 
3.  Utah’s Network of Restorative Justice Youth Courts 
 
Originally passed in 1999, the Utah Youth Court Diversion Act (“Youth 
Court Act”) defines the types of offenses that youth courts are permitted to hear, 
outlines the referral process for youth court juvenile offenders, lays out parameters 
for disposition options, creates a board responsible for certifying and evaluating 
youth courts, and permits local public school boards to provide school credit to 
students who volunteer in youth courts.195 
The Youth Court Act permits youth courts to take the cases of youth offenders 
who have committed “minor offenses,”196 which are defined as “any unlawful act 
that is a status offense or would be a class B or C misdemeanor, infraction, or 
violation.”197 Law enforcement personnel, school officials, prosecuting attorneys, 
juvenile court officers, and parents can refer juveniles to youth courts as an 
intervention aimed at preventing further juvenile delinquency.198 A youth court 
cannot accept referrals if it is not certified by the Utah Youth Court Board.199 Once 
a referral is made, the youth court coordinator must screen the case to determine if 
it qualifies.200 Youth courts can exercise authority over youths who do have a 
pending law violation with the juvenile courts if the juvenile courts and the 
prosecuting attorney agree, or if the youth court offense is not a law violation.201 
Youth courts can decline to accept a youth or terminate a youth for any reason, and 
a youth or a youth’s parent or guardian can withdraw from youth court at any 
time.202 
Youth volunteers determine the youth court dispositions (i.e. “sentences”) for 
each youth court. Acceptable dispositions include community service, educational 
classes, counseling, treatment, reporting to the youth court, participating in 
mentoring programs, participating as a volunteer with the youth court, letters of 
apology, essays, and “any other dispositions considered appropriate by the youth 
court and adult coordinator.”203 
Supporting the Youth Court Act, The Utah Youth Court Association 
(“UYCA”) is a collection of youth courts throughout the state of Utah. The UYCA 
aims to train and educate youth court workers and volunteers, help establish 
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restorative justice youth courts, collect statewide data, and promote the work of 
youth courts throughout the state.204 In 2015, Utah had twenty-three certified youth 
courts.205 Operating under the Youth Court Act, the UYCA’s youth courts can be 
used as restorative justice alternatives to the juvenile justice system. In this sense, 
Utah’s restorative justice youth courts can combat Utah’s STPP. 
 
(a)  Restorative Justice Youth Courts  
 
Restorative justice aims to prevent future criminal activity through a process 
that focuses on three stakeholders and three goals.206 The stakeholders are victims, 
communities, and offenders; the goals are community protection, skill 
development, and accountability.207 Restorative justice focuses on a process of 
“repairing harm and rebuilding relationships . . . that involves stakeholders in an 
active and respective way, while emphasizing the community’s role in problem 
solving.”208 Many youth courts have adopted restorative justice models. The 
National Association for Youth Courts reports “[t]he primary function of most 
youth court programs is to determine a fair and restorative sentence or disposition 
for the youth respondent.”209  
Additionally, in The Impact of Teen Court on Young Offenders, the 
researchers found that all the youth courts they evaluated had significantly lower 
rates of recidivism (less than 9%) than juvenile courts.210 The authors of the study 
concluded that effective youth courts could significantly lower the rate of 
recidivism, or the “rate at which youth commit new offenses after teen court.”211 
While practices varied significantly between the youth courts studied, the 
researchers noted that “many [youth volunteers] are former defendants” and 
positive peer pressure was “the one guiding idea behind all teen courts.”212   
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(b)  Weakening Utah’s School to Prison Pipeline with Restorative Justice 
Youth Courts 
 
Utah’s Youth Court Act sets up a framework for certified youth courts to 
legally operate as restorative justice diversion programs for first time juvenile 
offenders. With twenty-three certified youth courts throughout Utah enabled by the 
Youth Court Act, and the UYCA, youth courts can and should be used to combat 
Utah’s STPP. Utah’s youth courts can mitigate the effects of Utah’s racially biased 
STPP by: (i) serving as a quality control check on biased schoolhouse discipline, 
(ii) diverting students from juvenile court, and (iii) giving students a stake in the 
process of dismantling Utah’s STPP.   
 
(i)  Youth Courts as Quality-Control Checks on Biased 
Schoolhouse Discipline 
 
Under the Utah Youth Court Act, any person can refer a youth to a youth 
court for a minor first-time offense. This includes teachers, principals, and SROs. 
When a referral is sent to a local youth court, the adult coordinator at the youth 
court is required to screen all referrals to determine whether the youth qualifies for 
their restorative justice program. Since these are restorative justice youth courts, 
part of this screening process includes contacting the key stakeholders: the 
referring officer at the school (community member), the parent or legal guardian of 
the referred youth (offender’s family), the referred youth herself (offender), and 
any victims.213 If the screening process reveals that there was no real offense, an 
adult coordinator could declare the case unfit for youth court. The Youth Court Act 
also states that “[y]outh courts may decline to accept a youth” for any reason.214 
Since youth courts are required to screen referred youth and can reject referred 
youth for any reason, youth courts have a unique power to act as a check on the 
bias and abuse of discretion that contribute to the funneling of students into the 
STPP.215  
The UYCA collects statewide data on youth courts.216 Included in this data set 
is demographic information of the referred youth as well as the identity of the 
referring officer.217 If the UYCA and their member courts notice that certain 
referring officers disproportionately refer students of color, students with 
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disabilities, or LGBTQ students, the youth courts could scrutinize the statistics in 
the presence of the referring officer, decline further referrals from the referring 
officer, or do their best to fully support and nurture students referred to them from 
referring officers who disproportionately refer students from certain groups. In 
these ways, youth courts can use the data they collect to address some causes of 
Utah’s STPP.    
 
(ii)  Youth Courts as Effective Alternatives to Juvenile Court 
 
The Utah Youth Court Act sets up youth courts as early intervention diversion 
programs that serve as alternatives to juvenile court. When a first-time offender 
commits a class B or C misdemeanor, she can ask to be referred to a youth court 
program instead of juvenile court. Furthermore, under the Act, juvenile court 
officers and prosecuting attorneys have the power to give a youth court authority 
over a referred youth who is in juvenile court. Youth courts can address the 
funneling of students from school directly to juvenile court by serving as a legal 
alternative to juvenile court. 
The Fingerpaint to Fingerprints study revealed that a disproportionate 
amount of Pacific Islander and Black students were referred directly to law 
enforcement in Utah.218 By using youth courts as a precursor to juvenile courts, 
school officials and SROs can divert students from the STPP. The findings of The 
Impact of Teen Court on Youth Offenders study demonstrate that well-run youth 
courts have the potential to serve referred youth offenders better than juvenile 
courts, thereby addressing the disparate outcomes manifested in the STPP.219 
Youth courts can develop, rather than merely punish, referred youth by employing 
positive peer pressure to encourage referred youth to take accountability for their 
actions, develop new skills, and connect with the community.  
With low rates of recidivism, youth courts likely serve youth who are accused 
of violating certain low-level misdemeanors better than juvenile courts.220 
Furthermore, youth courts cost much less than juvenile courts.221 Even if Utah’s 
youth courts do not have significantly lower recidivism rates than Utah’s juvenile 
courts, the youth courts can still mitigate the criminalization effect of the STPP 
because they do not create criminal records for referred youth.222 As an alternative 
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to juvenile courts, youth courts can ease the effects of the STPP by diverting 
students from juvenile court, serving them better than juvenile court, and insulating 
them from a criminal record.  
 
(iii)  Youth Courts Give Students Powerful Roles 
 
By giving youth, the people targeted by the STPP, the power to actively 
engage with the penal system, youth courts give students the power to challenge 
the STPP.223 First, contrary to juvenile courts, youth courts give youth volunteers 
the responsibility of creating restorative dispositions for their peers. When youth 
volunteers believe that the “offense” committed by the referred youth is no offense 
at all, or is simply excusable by circumstance, the youth volunteers could suggest 
dismissal of the case or give the referred youth minimal disposition requirements. 
When youth volunteers believe that the offense committed requires attention, they 
have the unique power to support the referred youth with peer pressure and 
restorative dispositions that focus on accountability, skill development, and 
helping the referred youth connect with positive networks within the community.  
Second, many youth courts are made up of youth volunteers who previously 
appeared before the youth court as referred youth offenders.224 Former defendants 
understand how to successfully navigate and use the restorative justice youth court 
process. As youth who have made mistakes, former defendants have great potential 
to connect with referred youth by telling their story and explaining how they 
successfully completed youth court. Furthermore, if former defendants feel like 
they were racially profiled or unfairly disciplined, they have the power to advocate 
for their peers when they believe referred youth are unfairly before the court, 
thereby addressing the disparate impacts of the STPP.  
 
C.  Expanding Juveniles’ Rights and Improving Parens Patriae Discretion 
 
While discretion is often necessary and should not be wholly eliminated from 
the juvenile justice system, Utah should adopt the following measures to 
strengthen juveniles’ rights and guide the discretionary powers of state actors. 
These changes should improve the balance of power between juveniles and state 
actors, and mitigate the effects of the STPP on juveniles throughout the state.  
First, Utah should guarantee counsel at all stages for indigent parties in 
juvenile delinquency and child welfare proceedings. If Utah takes the 
constitutional rights of its juveniles seriously, this is a necessary step. Utah cannot 
overlook the results of its Working Group’s report, which exposes how bias and 
abuse of discretion contribute to the funneling of students into the juvenile justice 
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system, and demonstrates that youth are subject to disparate outcomes once they 
are in the juvenile justice system.225 Furthermore, the lasting negative effects of the 
STPP on juveniles supports protecting their constitutional right to counsel; once a 
youth has been funneled into the STPP, the cards are stacked against her for the 
rest of her life.226 While appointing counsel to indigent youth defendants does not 
directly prevent students from being funneled into the STPP, it does address what 
happens to students once they are in the pipeline.   
Second, Utah should grant juveniles a statutory right to evidence-based 
rehabilitative treatment. If our juvenile justice system is based on the premise that 
“juveniles are different” than adults because they are more amenable to 
rehabilitation,227 then granting juveniles this right is the next logical step. The 
evolution of America’s juvenile justice system, and the Working Group’s report, 
has shown that “unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is 
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.”228 Rather than relying on 
the benevolence of its public school officials, its SROs, its probation officers, and 
its juvenile court judges, Utah should empower juveniles with the right to hold the 
state accountable to the principle of rehabilitation. Utah could do this by giving 
juveniles a right to evidence-based rehabilitative treatment that is only lost if the 
juvenile commits a heinous crime and has failed a graduated list of evidence-based 
rehabilitative treatments.    
Third, Utah should expand the Miranda rights of juveniles by creating a 
statutory right to Miranda warnings in all school-based interrogations.229 To 
further safeguard juveniles’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 
Utah should require all public school personnel (including SROs) to consult with a 
youth’s parent, legal guardian, or custodian before asking the youth about any 
criminal violation above a class B misdemeanor (whether the youth is a suspect or 
a witness). If Miranda rights are not read to the youth’s parent, legal guardian, or 
custodian before any questioning begins, Utah courts should be instructed to 
suppress all evidence obtained from the questioning.230 This broadened 
constitutional protection would intentionally make criminal investigations against 
juveniles in the school setting burdensome. Instead of pursuing criminal charges 
against juveniles, it would be easier for school officials to pursue the rehabilitative 
and restorative justice processes, or diversion programs already in place.231  
                                                      
225 FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1–11.  
226 REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 22–23.  
227 Coupet, supra note 21, at 1306 (citation omitted). 
228 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967). 
229 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (holding “that when an 
individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in 
any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination 
is jeopardized” and “[p]rocedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege.”). 
230 See id. at 479 (“But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated 
by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used 
against him.”). 
231 See discussion supra Part B.2.(b).  
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Fourth, Utah should pass legislation mandating that school boards throughout 
the state offer a minimum of three evidence-based, CCJJ certified diversion 
programs. For each program to be certified, it must meet standards adopted by the 
CCJJ regarding the rehabilitative or restorative justice qualities of the program. To 
assist the annual certification process, each program must submit annual reports to 
the CCJJ that include referral data (i.e. who gets referred to the programs, who 
does not, and for what offenses), and outcomes for each referred youth (i.e. 
required dispositions, graduation data, behavioral changes). This reform would 
hold diversion programs accountable to evidence-based standards and avoid the 
drawbacks usually associated with granting broad discretion: bias, abuse of 
discretion, and disparate outcomes.  
Fifth, Utah’s State Office of Education and the CCJJ should partner in 
researching and proposing a mandatory maximum class size throughout the state’s 
public schools. Utah’s parens patriae and in loco parentis powers are most potent 
in the public schools, where teachers oversee the education, socialization, and 
development of our children. If large class sizes dilute the influence of our teachers 
so they cannot fully support each student’s positive development, there should be 
cause for concern. While it is important for Utah to invest in expanding its 
rehabilitative processes on the back end—after juveniles have gone astray—it is 
equally important to invest in preventative influence on the front end, before 
juveniles go astray. This is especially true when the infrastructure to support 
preventative counseling, K–12 public schools, is already in place. 
 
II.  CONCLUSION 
 
Utah’s STTP problem needs to be resolved. Zero tolerance policies, the 
limited constitutional rights of students, the police power of school administrators, 
the injection of SROs into our schools without clear job responsibilities and 
training, and the imbalance of power between students and state actors all 
contribute to Utah’s biased STPP. To address the STPP, researchers encourage: the 
expansion of legal protections for juveniles; the re-training of SROs and 
employment contracts that clearly define SROs’ responsibilities; the use of 
restorative justice practices and other evidence-based alternatives to the juvenile 
justice system; and reforming the discretionary power of state actors to cite, refer, 
and sentence youth within the juvenile justice system.  
Utah’s new SRO Law, the Juvenile Defense Law, and the Amendments to the 
discretionary power of state actors take important steps in addressing the causes 
and the effects of the STPP. These reforms, however, are not enough. Utah should 
expand the protections for juveniles by providing counsel at all stages for indigent 
youth in juvenile delinquency and child welfare proceedings, by granting juveniles 
the statutory right to evidence-based rehabilitative treatment, and by significantly 
expanding their Miranda rights at school. Utah should improve how its actors 
exercise discretion in shaping juveniles by enforcing evidence-driven standards for 
the administration of its diversion programs, and by adopting a mandatory 
maximum on class sizes in public schools throughout the state. Without these 
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additional reforms, the discretionary authority of state actors will continue to 
overpower juveniles’ weakened constitutional rights, leading to the bias and abuse 
of discretion that cause, as well as the disparate outcomes that are manifested in, 
Utah’s STPP.  
